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Abstract
Choices involving risk significantly affect the distribution of income and wealth in
society. This paper reports the results of the first experiment, to our knowledge, to
study fairness views about risk-taking, specifically whether such views are based chiefly
on ex ante opportunities or on ex post outcomes. We find that, even though many
participants focus exclusively on ex ante opportunities, most favor some redistribution
ex post. Many participants also make a distinction between ex post inequalities that
reflect differences in luck and ex post inequalities that reflect differences in choices.
These findings apply to both stakeholders and impartial spectators
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People make choices involving risk in all spheres of life, and the outcomes of these choices
fundamentally affect the distribution of income and wealth in society. At the same time,
people often disagree about the fair allocation of gains and losses that inevitably result from
risky choices. This is reflected in the many heated debates about the fairness of public poli-
cies dealing with consequences of risk-taking, including welfare and social security policies,
income and profit taxation, and, as illustrated by the recent financial crisis, government
bailouts of distressed industries.
How to deal fairly with risk-taking is often cast in terms of the question of whether to
focus on ex ante opportunities or ex post outcomes.1 The conflict between these two views
is most clearly seen when people have equal opportunities. In such cases, the ex ante view,
which focuses on initial opportunities, provides a fairness argument for no redistribution of
gains and losses from risk-taking. The ex post view, on the other hand, focuses on outcomes,
and provides a fairness argument for eliminating all inequalities resulting from risk-taking.
Clearly, such fairness considerations need to be balanced against efficiency concerns, but this
conflict illustrates how, potentially, people’s fairness views about risk-taking could signifi-
cantly impact the support for and, consequently, the design of public policies. Such views
are arguably important for understanding behavior in a wide range of economic contexts,
including the behavior of workers, labor unions, managers, and government regulators.
This paper reports the results from the first experiment, to our knowledge, to study
fairness views about risk-taking.2 The study focuses on cases in which it is costly to avoid
risk; thus, we do not consider gambling or other risk-seeking behavior. The experiment
consisted of two stages, a risk-taking phase followed by a distribution phase. In the risk-
taking phase, participants faced a sequence of choices between a risky and a safe alternative,
where the value of the safe alternative varied. In the distribution phase, for each risk-taking
situation, the participants were anonymously paired with other participants who had faced
the same choice and the earnings of each pair were pooled. In all distributive situations,
therefore, we had ex ante equality in opportunities, but possibly ex post inequalities in
1There is an extensive literature on how to evaluate risky situations within both economics and philosophy.
See, among others, Harsanyi (1955); Diamond (1967); Hammond (1981); Fried (2003); Harel, Safra, and Segal
(2005); Fleurbaey (2007).
2Various recent experimental and theoretical studies have examined possible trade-offs between the desire
to achieve a fair distribution and the desire to avoid risk (Babicky 2003; Babicky and Ortmann 2005; Brennan,
Gonza´lez, Gu¨th, and Levati 2008; Krawczyk and Le Lec 2008; Krawczyk 2010; Magdalou, Dubois, and
Nguyen-Van 2009). The experiments of Zizzo and Oswald (2001) and Zizzo (2003, 2004) come closest to
our study. In a series of interesting experiments, subjects first choose how much to invest in a risky gamble,
earnings are distributed and then subjects can (and often do) destroy the earnings of other participants.
Our study differs in several respects, but most importantly we place no restrictions on how the participants
choose to distribute the money in the distribution phase and this allows us to focus on the fairness preferences
of individuals rather than on envy. See also Shogren (1992) for an experimental study of bargaining over ex
ante lotteries and ex post rewards.
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individual earnings. The participants were then informed about the choices and the outcomes
of the risk-taking phase for both parties and asked to distribute the total earnings.
This design enables us to focus on our two main questions. First, do people in situations
of equal opportunities deviate from the ex ante fairness view and redistribute gains and
losses from risk-taking? Second, do people make a distinction between ex post inequalities
that reflect differences in luck and ex post inequalities that reflect differences in choices?
An intermediate fairness position, which we refer to as choice egalitarianism, holds people
responsible for their choices, but not for their luck. Such a view would endorse ex post
redistribution between lucky and unlucky risk-takers but not between risk-takers and par-
ticipants who choose the safe alternative.3 The design also allows us to study whether the
attractiveness of the ex ante view depends on how costly it is to avoid risks, as captured
by the value of the safe alternative. A conjecture in this regard is that the ex ante position
would be considered less appealing in cases where the safe alternative is very unattractive,
and, as a result, the risky alternative appears virtually unavoidable.
In addition to the “stakeholder” described thus far, who made decisions about risk-taking
and redistribution, we also randomly assigned some participants to the role as “spectator”
in the experiment. The spectators did not make choices in the risk-taking phase but in-
stead acted as third parties who were paid a fixed fee to allocate the total earnings of other
subjects in the distribution phase. Specifically, spectators allocated the pooled earnings of
pairs of stakeholders in a randomly selected subsample of the distributive situations. By
comparing the behavior of the two groups, one can examine the extent to which the fairness
considerations of stakeholders deviate from the fairness views of impartial spectators. In
particular, this allows us to study whether the involvement in the risk-taking phase makes
stakeholders assign more importance to choices in the distribution phase. This comparison
is also of considerable importance from a methodological point of view. Previous empirical
research on the nature of social preferences has relied on both spectator (Charness and Rabin
2002; Engelmann and Strobel 2004; Konow, Saijo, and Akai 2009; Konow 2009, 2000) and
stakeholder behavior (Cappelen, Hole, Sørensen, and Tungodden 2007b; Cherry, Frykblom,
and Shogren 2002; Engelmann and Strobel 2004; Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Frohlich, Oppen-
heimer, and Kurki 2004), but this is the first study to look at whether these two approaches
support the same set of findings within a given experiment.
Our analysis provides four main findings. First, we show that, although the ex ante
fairness view is the most prominent among the participants, the majority of participants favor
some ex post redistribution, even when, as here, people had the same ex ante opportunities.
3This fairness perspective has been discussed extensively in the philosophical literature (see Dworkin
1981a,b; Arneson 1989; Lippert-Rasmussen 2001; Fleurbaey 2002; Vallentyne 2002; Fried 2003).
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Second, we find that, among the participants who redistribute earnings, a substantial share
make a distinction between ex post inequalities resulting from different choices versus ex post
inequalities that result from differences in luck. Overall, most participants find it fair not to
equalize ex post inequalities that result from different choices, but most also find it fair to
equalize ex post inequalities resulting from differences in luck among risk-takers. Third, we
show that the appeal of the ex ante view is independent of how costly it is to avoid exposure
to risk. Fourth, even though the choices of stakeholders clearly reflect a selfish motive, we
find that stakeholders and spectators act on the same set of fairness considerations. Thus,
the two approaches support the same set of conclusions about fairness preferences over the
gains and losses from risk-taking.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the experimental design. Section 2
analyzes the choices of spectators. Section 3 introduces a model of distributive choice that
we estimate for both spectators and stakeholders. Section 4 concludes.
1 Design and procedures
We recruited participants among students at a Norwegian business school. A total of 119
subjects participated in the four sessions that lasted about 40 minutes and that all took
place on the same day. Including a 100 NOK show up fee, subjects earned, on average, 472
Norwegian Kroner (NOK) or about 75 USD. The experiment was conducted in a computer
lab using web-based interface and was double blind, i.e., neither subjects nor experimenters
could associate decisions with particular subjects. Moreover, earnings were paid anony-
mously by wire using payment codes through an independent accounting division, a fact
that was communicated to all subjects.
At the beginning of the experiment, the participants were randomly assigned to be either
stakeholders (78 subjects) or spectators (41 subjects). There were two decision-making
phases: a risk-taking phase and a distribution phase. Only stakeholders participated in
the risk-taking phase, in which they were asked to choose between a safe alternative and
a risky alternative in four different risk-taking situations. In each of the four cases, the
risky alternative contained two equally likely outcomes of 800 NOK and 0 NOK. Hence, the
expected value of the risky alternative was always 400 NOK. The safe alternative varied
across the four situations and took on the values 400 NOK, 300 NOK, 200 NOK or 25 NOK.
The four situations were presented in random order.
Table 1 provides an overview of the choices made by the 78 stakeholders in the risk-taking
phase. Only 7 participants made choices that reflected potentially risk-loving preferences.
Hence, almost all participants were weakly risk averse, but none so risk averse as to choose
4
the safe alternative when it had a value of 25 NOK. Considering the complete set of choices
of each stakeholder, we observe that the preferences of all but five obey monotonicity, i.e.,
a subject who chooses the risky alternative for a high value of the safe alternative also does
so for lower values of the safe alternative.
[Table 1 about here.]
In the distribution phase, stakeholders were anonymously and randomly paired with a
sequence of eight other stakeholders. For each pair, one of the four situations from the risk-
taking phase was randomly drawn and the stakeholder was asked to determine how the total
earnings of the two stakeholders should be distributed among them. Before they made their
choice, the participants were informed about the choices and outcomes of the risk-taking
phase for both parties. Thus, there was no uncertainty about the source of inequality in
earnings. Moreover, given that this was a one-shot experiment, incentive considerations
should not influence the choices of the participants. The distributive situations were pre-
sented in random order, and after making their decisions, the participants were given a
final opportunity to revise all of them, if desired. Correspondingly, the spectators made
eight distributive choices from a randomly selected subsample of the distributive situations
faced by the stakeholders. The spectators were provided with the same information as the
stakeholders. In total, we have 530 distributive situations with positive total earnings; 112
distributive situations where one stakeholder chose the risky alternative and the other stake-
holder chose the safe alternative, 152 distributive situations where both stakeholders choose
the safe alternative, and 266 distributive situations where both chose the risky alternative
and at least one of them was lucky. Spectators made choices in 283 distributive situations
with positive earnings. All allocations were restricted to multiples of 25 NOK.
At the beginning of the experiment, stakeholders were told that the computer would
randomly choose one of the situations and one of the choices in this situation to determine
their final outcome. Spectators received a fixed payment of 350 NOK unrelated to their
decisions.
2 Ex ante or ex post?
We begin by analyzing the distributive choices of spectators, presented in panels A–E in
Figure 1.
We observe in panel A that the most common choice among spectators is to distribute
equally among the two participants. This is predominantly the case when there is equality in
individual earnings (panel C), but, interestingly, equal split is also the most common choice
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when ex post earnings are unequal (panel B). Clearly, therefore, many spectators deviate
from the ex ante position in their distributive choices and deem it fair to redistribute earnings
ex post.
[Figure 1 about here.]
Many spectators, however, make a distinction between different sources of ex post in-
equalities. As shown in Figure 1, spectators choose to equalize earnings in more than 40
percent of the distributive situations where lucky and unlucky risk-takers meet (panel D),
whereas this only happens in about 20 percent of the distributive situations where a risk-
taker is paired with a participant choosing the safe alternative (panel E). It is evident,
therefore, that many spectators consider ex post inequalities between participants who have
made different choices acceptable but find ex post inequalities due to luck unfair (even in
cases where people have equal opportunities and risk is avoidable).
Is deviation from the ex ante perspective more frequent in situations where it is very
costly for the participants to avoid risk? To study this question, we look at the level of
redistribution among spectators in situations where lucky risk-takers are paired with unlucky
risk-takers. In such situations, the total earnings to be distributed is always 800 NOK, i.e.,
equal to the individual ex post earnings of the lucky risk-taker. Table 2 shows how much of
this is transferred ex post to the unlucky risk-taker. We observe that the share transferred
is invariant to the value of the safe alternative; in all three cases, the unlucky risk-taker
receives on average about 30 percent of the total earnings. Hence, spectators do not make
a distinction between situations where risk is almost unavoidable and situations where the
cost of avoiding risk is relatively small.
[Table 2 about here.]
Overall, the data show that the ex ante, the ex post and the choice egalitarian fairness
views can account for around 75 percent of the distributive choices made by the spectators,
i.e., almost all choices are in line with at least one of these fairness views.4 Hence, given
that there is always some stochastic behavior in an experiment, the three views seem to
capture the fairness considerations of the spectators. This does not, however, provide us
with a precise measure of the frequency of each of the fairness views among the spectators,
since these views coincide in a number of distributive situations, for example, when there is
equality in ex post earnings. In order to address this issue, we formulate a model of individual
distributive preferences and then estimate which distribution of fairness views best explains
4In total, 248 out of 328 spectator distributions are exactly equal to one of the fairness ideals.
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the behavior of the participants. This also allows us to compare the fairness views of the
spectators and the stakeholders.
As can be observed from panel F in Figure 1, stakeholders equalize much less frequently
than spectators. Stakeholders equalize in only about 20 percent of the distributive situations,
and, in the majority of the remaining situations, they take everything for themselves. The
latter is consistent with stakeholders being motivated by self-interest in their distributive
choices, but a model is needed to determine whether these choices also are consistent with
the fairness considerations made by the spectators.
3 A model of distributive choice
In this section we introduce a model of distributive choice that enables us to study further
the frequency of the different fairness views and the role of self-interest.
We assume that a stakeholder is motivated by fairness considerations and by income
when considering how to distribute the total earnings X generated in the risk-taking phase.
More specifically, we assume that stakeholder i is maximizing the following utility function
when making distributive choices:
V
k(i)
i (yi; ·) = γyi − βi(yi − F k(i))2/2X, (1)
where yi is what a stakeholder i allocates to him- or herself, and F
k(i) is what a stakeholder
considers to be his or her fair income. Stakeholders might differ both in the weight they
attach to fairness considerations and in what they consider to be a fair distribution. For an
interior solution, the optimal proposal, y∗i , is
y∗i = F
k(i) + (γ/βi)X. (2)
Hence, a stakeholder takes at least what he or she considers fair, and more depending on
how much weight he or she assigns to fairness. We assume that spectators maximize the
same utility function, with two exceptions: the first term is always zero, and the second
term is defined for the spectator’s preferences over the income of one of the two stakeholders
in a pair. Hence, trivially, the interior solution for a spectator is to choose what he or she
considers the fair allocation of the total earnings between the two stakeholders.
Informed by our analysis of spectators in Section 2, we assume that the individuals
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endorse the ex post (EP), ex ante (EA), or choice egalitarian (CE) fairness views,
FEPi =
1
2
X, (3)
FEAi = xi, (4)
FCEi =
12X if Ci = Cj,xi if Ci 6= Cj, (5)
where xi is individual i’s earnings and Ci takes the value 1 if the individual chooses the risky
alternative and the value 0 otherwise.
3.1 Estimates of the choice model
We assume a discrete choice random utility model of the form
Ui(y; ·) = V k(i)i (y; ·) + yi, for y = 0, 25, . . . , X, (6)
where the yi are assumed to be iid extreme value. For each individual, with a fixed (k, β),
the choice probabilities then have a simple logit form. We assume that βi has a log normal
distribution, such that log β ∼ N(ζ, σ2).
Let the vector θ represent all parameters to be estimated. We can now write the likelihood
contribution of an individual conditional on a fairness perspective k as,
Lki (θ) =
∫ ∞
0
(
Ji∏
j=1
eV
k(yij ;,β,·)∑
s∈Yij e
V k(s;β,·)
)
dF (β; ζ, σ). (7)
The index j = 1, . . . , Ji indicates the number of choices made by individual i and Yij is the
choice set {0, . . . , Xij} for individual i in situation j. For the total likelihood contribution
of an individual, we must weight with the population shares of individuals with different
fairness views, λEA, λCE, and λEP ,
Li(θ) =
∑
k
λkLki (θ). (8)
Table 3 reports estimates for different specifications of the model. The population share
for each of the fairness views is the estimated proportion of the participants motivated by
this particular fairness standard.
[Table 3 about here.]
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From the estimates in (1), we observe that the ex ante standard is the most frequent
fairness view among the participants, accounting for the behavior of around 40 percent of
the individuals. Still, a majority of the participants endorses ex post redistribution when ex
post inequalities reflect differences in luck. Only a minority of around 30 percent endorses
equalization of all ex post inequalities.
In specification (1) of Table 3, stakeholders and spectators are assumed to have different
distributions of β, but are restricted to have the same population shares of individuals holding
the different fairness views. In specification (2), we loosen the restriction that the population
shares are the same among stakeholders and spectators. It turns out that this restriction is
not binding, as can be seen from the very similar estimates of λEA, λCE, and λEP for the two
groups, as well as from the small change in the likelihood value. Thus, the model provides
strong evidence of spectators and stakeholders making the same set of fairness considerations
in this experiment, their choices differing only in that the stakeholders also are motivated by
self-interest. In specifications 3–5, we show that all three fairness views are needed in order
to explain the data; dropping any of them substantially reduces likelihood.5
3.2 How well does the estimated model fit the data?
To study how well the model fits the data, we use the model to simulate and predict the
actual distribution of data in different situations.
[Figure 2 about here.]
As we can see from Figure 2, the model fits very nicely the behavior of both stakeholders
and spectators. One might have expected more noise in the choices of spectators than
among stakeholders, since spectators do not have any economic incentives in the choices
they make, but this is not borne out in the data. This most likely reflects that the moral
incentives created by the distributive situations being real is sufficient to motivate spectators
in distributive choices, which is consistent with evidence from other studies (e.g. Charness
and Rabin 2002; Engelmann and Strobel 2004; Konow 2009).
3.3 Fairness preferences and political views
A motivation for this study was the prominent role played by arguments of fairness in political
debates on public policies dealing with consequences of risk-taking. Hence, it is interesting
to examine whether the fairness views identified in this experiment relates in any systematic
5Note that since the hypothesis that one of the λk is zero is on the boundary of the parameter space,
standard likelihood ratio tests do not apply (Andrews 2001).
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manner to the participants’ political views. Is it the case that the ex ante view, holding
individuals responsible for both their choices and luck, is more prominent among right-wing
people, and that the ex post fairness view, opposing all inequalities, is more prominent
among left-wing people?
At the end of the experiment we asked the participants about their political views, to
place themselves on a seven point scale with with very left-wing and very right-wing as the
extreme points. The distribution of responses is reported in Table 4.6
[Table 4 about here.]
We observe that the majority of students identified themselves as right-wing, which might
reflect that these are students at a business school. In order to obtain equally sized groups
in the following analysis, we have classified “slightly right-wing” as moderate, and grouped
the rest into left-wing and right-wing, respectively.
In order to compare these responses to individual behavior in the experiment, we need
to use the estimates reported in Table 3 (specification 1) to identify the likelihood of any
specific individual holding a particular fairness view. Given an individual’s choices, we apply
Bayes’ theorem,
P (k|y, Z) = P (y|k, Z)P (k|Z)
P (y|Z) for k ∈ {EA,CE,EP}, (9)
where P (k|y, Z) is the a posteriori probability of having the fairness view k given that
the choice y is made in a situation described by the vector Z. These probabilities can be
calculated by applying (7) and (8).7
Figure 3 shows how well the model identifies fairness views at the individual level, by
reporting the distribution of the a posteriori probability of the most likely fairness ideal for
each individual. We observe that a large majority of the spectators and a substantial share
of the stakeholders are identified very precisely.8
[Figure 3 about here.]
6Of course, the cut-off point for distinguishing left- and right-wing political positions can differ across
countries, and our pool of Norwegian business students might or might not be average compared to a more
international sample. Nevertheless, that should not matter for our purposes, since Norwegians conceptualize
left and right as pointing roughly toward the same poles as do those in other countries, irrespective of where
they place the cut-off points.
7The expression P (y|k, Z) corresponds to Lki (θ) as defined in (7), P (k|Z) is simply the population share
λk, and P (y|Z) is the total likelihood contribution Li(θ) defined in (8). For further discussion of this
approach, see Cappelen, Drange Hole, Sørensen, and Tungodden (2007a).
8It is hard to identify the fairness view of some stakeholders, mainly because they took everything for
themselves.
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Table 5 reports how the average a posteriori probability of having each of the three fairness
views relates to political views. Interestingly, we observe that moderate and right-wing
individuals are much more likely to hold the ex ante fairness view, whereas the ex post fairness
view is most likely among left-wing individuals. This suggests that the fairness preferences
expressed in this experiment reflect deeper political convictions, and, consequently, that the
observed heterogeneity is also present in situations outside the laboratory where gains and
losses from risk-taking are distributed.
[Table 5 about here.]
4 Concluding remarks
Our experiment provides strong evidence that many people consider fairness to go beyond
equalizing opportunities in the context of risk-taking. Still, mirroring the political debate,
the experiment also reveals considerable disagreement on how to allocate fairly the gains and
losses from risk-taking. A substantial share of the participants endorses the ex ante view,
but a substantial share also endorses the ex post view. Nevertheless, if we look separately
at how to deal with inequalities between lucky and unlucky risk-takers and between risk-
takers and people choosing the safe alternative, we find, on each issue, that the majority of
the participants favors the choice egalitarian distribution. On the issue of how to distribute
between lucky and unlucky risk-takers, the majority finds it fair to eliminate inequalities. On
the issue of how to distribute between risk-takers and people choosing the safe alternative,
the majority finds inequalities in outcomes justifiable.
If these estimates reflect general political views, as indicated by our analysis, it has inter-
esting implications for which public policies could gain political support from the majority
of voters. To illustrate, consider the case of smoking. Smoking is a risky activity; some
smokers, but not all, end up with a need for costly treatment. Given equal opportunities,
what would be a fair distribution of costs of such health care? The choice egalitarian view
implies that the fair solution is that non-smokers not be required to contribute to financing
such treatment, but that the costs of treatment be shared equally among lucky and unlucky
smokers (Cappelen and Norheim 2005). In short, this provides a justification for a tax on
cigarettes, whereby the revenues are used to finance the treatment of tobacco related health
problems.
To highlight that risk-taking raises new questions of fairness, the present study has fo-
cussed on how to deal with risk-taking in a setting of equal opportunities. Important avenues
for future research would be to study people’s fairness views on risk-taking where there is
11
inequality in initial opportunities, and the extent to which they vary across contexts and
cultures.
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Figure 1: Histograms of share given
Note: A: Distribution of all spectator decisions, share given to one of the stakeholders
(randomly defined). B: Distribution of spectator decisions where there are unequal ex post
earnings, share given to one of the stakeholders (randomly defined). C: Distribution of
spectator decisions when ex post earnings are equal, share given to one of the stakeholders
(randomly defined). D: Distribution of spectator decisions when lucky meets unlucky, share
given to lucky risk-taker. E: Distribution of spectator decisions when risk-taker meets safe,
share given to risk-taker. F: Distribution of all stakeholder decisions, share given to the
other participant.
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Figure 2: Actual and predicted share given by stakeholders and spectators in various situa-
tions
Note: A: Distribution of stakeholder decisions when ex post earnings are equal, share given to
the other participant. B: Distribution of spectator decisions when ex post earnings are equal,
share given to one of the stakeholders (randomly defined). C: Distribution of stakeholder
decisions when lucky meets unlucky, share given to the other participant. D: Distribution of
spectator decisions when lucky meets unlucky, share given to lucky risk-taker. E: Distribution
of stakeholder decisions when risk-taker meets safe, share given to the other participant. F:
Distribution of spectator decisions when risk-taker meets safe, share given to risk-taker.
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Figure 3: Identification of fairness views at the individual level
Note: The histograms shows the distribution of the a posteriori probability of the most
likely fairness ideal for each individual, maxk{P (k|y, Z}, for stakeholders and spectators.
Calculations are based on specification (1) in Table 3.
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Table 1: Risk choices made by participants.
Risk choice
Value of safe alternative safe alternative risky alternative Total
25 0 78 78
200 5 73 78
300 28 50 78
400 71 7 78
104 208 312
Table 2: Redistribution when a lucky risk-taker meets an unlucky risk-taker (spectators)
Value of safe alternative Average share redistributed
25 0.338
(0.041)
n = 41
200 0.321
(0.045)
n = 36
300 0.319
(0.053)
n = 18
Note: Share redistributed is defined as share of total earnings transferred to the unlucky risk-
taker. Standard errors in parantheses. Given that we only have seven individuals choosing
the risky choice when the value of the safe alternative is 400 NOK, we have not included
these observations in the table.
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Table 4: Distribution of responses on political views
frequency share cumulative share
1. very left wing 0 0 0.0
2. left wing 7 0.059 0.059
3. slightly left wing 9 0.076 0.135
4. moderate 24 0.202 0.336
5. slightly right wing 40 0.336 0.672
6. right wing 33 0.277 0.950
7. very right wing 6 0.050 1.0
Note: The question stated was: “Below is a seven-point scale on which the political views
that people might hold are arranged from very left-wing to very right-wing. Where would
you place yourself on this scale?”
Table 5: Fairness views and political beliefs
Political view
left moderate right
P (EP |PV ) 0.368 0.246 0.250
(0.052) (0.050) (0.046)
P (CE|PV ) 0.319 0.304 0.255
(0.045) (0.050) (0.045)
P (EA|PV ) 0.313 0.451 0.495
(0.049) (0.059) (0.061)
N 40 40 39
Note: P (k|PV ) is the average a posteriori probability of holding fairness view k ∈
{EA,CE,EP} among those who reported political view PV , calculated according to (9)
and using the estimates of specification (1) in Table 3. Standard errors in parentheses.
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